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Article 4

STRATEGIC AIRLIFT: A CASUALTY OF DEREGULATION
by
Kent N. Gourdin
University of North Carolina at Charlotte

INTRODUCTION
In any society, logistics is the means for bridging the gap
between the national economy and a planned military operation.
However, in a democracy, logistics planning must compete with
other national objectives for an equitable distribution of that soci
ety's scarce resources. The share allocated to logistics must be
effectively utilized to create and sustain military forces in support of
National policies and objectives. Towards that goal, logistics is
comprised of four principal processes: requirements determination,
acquisition, distribution, and conservation. The suboptimization of
one of these components can adversely effect the entire logistics
function which would have severe consequences for the defense
effort as a whole. In other words, it makes little sense to procure
sophisticated equipment (acquisition), but lack the ability to expedi
tiously move it to the front lines (distribution).1
This paper will focus on the transportation component of the
distribution process, specifically addressing the contention that the
U.S. commercial aviation sector is no longer capable of fulfilling its
wartime mission. The implication is that, without a fully responsive
contingency distribution system, the logistics element would be
unable to support national defense objectives. Clearly, without
logistics a sustained war cannot be fought, let alone won. In a broad
sense, this article will examine the deteriorating linkage between
civilian wartime transportation providers and users (the Department
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of Defense). Specific areas to be addressed include military trans
portation, strategic airlift, and several peripheral concerns of impor
tance.

MILITARY TRANSPORTATION
Transportation has historically been recognized as a critical
factor in the success (or failure) of military campaigns. During the
War of 1812, the United States incurred enormous costs associated
with transporting men and material, due to inadequate facilities and
transportation routes. In fact, the almost universal opinion at the
time was that those facilities could have been built for what it cost to
cope without them.2 Sokol notes that, once the situation has
become stabilized, the logistics problem, primarily one of transporta
tion, becomes of primary concern.3 Similarly, General Douglas
McArthur realized the importance of establishing and maintaining a
viable logistical chain, stating that tactics can be decisively influenced
by the means at hand for maneuvering, supplying, and controlling
combat forces.4
Rather than investing in, and maintaining, transport resources
necessary only for war, the U.S. policy has been to rely on the
nation's commercial transportation industries to make their person
nel and equipment available to the DOD should the need arise. This
is in contrast to the Soviet Union, which maintains military airlift and
sealift assets beyond those required to meet peacetime needs. The
transport aircraft carry the livery of Aeroflot, the national airline,
while the ships fly the flag of the merchant marine, but they are, in
actuality, intended to satisfy contingency transport needs. In fact,
our government has repeatedly turned to the civilian sector for its
contingency transportation needs. Early in American history, the
military practice was to contract with civilians for the provision of
support functions such as transportation.5 With the outbreak of
World War I, the nation found itself with a private rail network
unable to meet wartime transport demands. In order to win that

48

Journal of Transportation Management

FIGURE 1. Air Transportation Policy Formulation & Implementation

conflict, the federal government took over the railroads in 1917 and
ran the system until 1920.6 This linkage between defense and
commercial transportation interests continues to exist today, and
forms the foundation for much of our total wartime movement
capability.
An important characteristic of this relationship is that the
government has exerted very little influence over the equipment
developed for, and operated by, transport companies. Rather, the
DOD "makes do" with planes, ships, and vehicles operated by firms
whose profit-driven needs may be significantly different from those
of defense planners. As an example, two mechanized air cargo
handling systems have evolved over the years, one developed by the
military and one by the civilian air carriers. The two are partially,
though not totally, compatible, a situation that could be extremely
limiting in a contingency. However, a larger and more serious
problem arises when the needs of the carriers no longer coincide
with those of national defense. For example, one of the initial
results of airline deregulation was that carriers began operating
smaller airplanes over shorter routes, often replacing larger aircraft
with these new fuel efficient aircraft. Unfortunately, these new
planes were of little use to the DOD, which still required large, longrange aircraft. We will return to this commonality question later.
The formal institutional relationship between national security
and air transportation goals is depicted in figure 1. Haefele notes
that it is national purpose--as articulated and expanded in national
goals--that determines the structure of supporting policies.7 Thus,
the various cabinet Secretaries are concerned with establishing
policies and objectives within their respective departments that will
contribute to the attainment of the overall national objectives as
specified by the President. However, the specification of national
security goals also influences the development of transportation
goals insofar as the nation's transport is expected to support the
DOD. This may be, unfortunately, a one-way street While national
transportation policy includes a commitment to meet the needs of
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national defense, defense policy is often developed with little regard
for the availability of adequate transport resources. The result is that
the transportation system must often react to, rather than evolve
with, DOD policy since it is not until national transportation policy is
implemented that the specific needs of one sector relative to the
other are actively considered. The intended objective should be to
utilize the nation's transportation resources so as to meet the needs
of both. However, the actual results may be quite different, as the
following example will readily illustrate.
Design on the Army's new Ml tank was begun in 1973. The full
production run called for 7,058 vehicles to be manufactured at a
unit cost of $2.68 million. It was not until mid-1981 that the Army
rigorously addressed the transport problems inherent in the move
ment of the 60 ton behemoth. The Pentagon noted that a standard
rail car could only handle one Ml, so the proposed solution was to
build 569 stronger, more expensive flatcars that could accommodate
2 tanks each.8 Similarly, air transportation is constrained in that the
C5 wide-body airlifter can only carry one vehicle, effectively limiting
the weapon's usefulness as a part of a short-notice deployment

STRATEGIC AIRLIFT
The entire concept of strategic airlift (i.e. between the United
States and overseas areas) was formulated with the start of World
War II.9 Since the military had little long-range air transport experi
ence, the domestic airline community was pressed into service to fill
the void. Though operating under the auspices of the Army's Air
Transport Command and the Naval Air Transport Service, the
carriers used their own equipment, facilities, and personnel to
provide the capability for long-haul, rapid movement of men and
equipment so desperately needed. In essence, the airlines them
selves built and operated the wartime strategic airlift organizations.
Following the war, the Air Force's Military Air Transport Service
(MATS) became the permanent strategic air movement arm of the
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United States military establishment. In 1965, MATS became the
Military Airlift Command (MAC), which continues to perform as the
single DOD manager for airlift. Strategic air movement is provided
with an organic fleet of 96 C-5 wide-body aircraft, and 267 narrowbody C141 s.10
To augment this capability in time of war or national emergency,
the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) Program was created in 1951,
whereby civilian air carrier aircraft were identified by tail number
and allocated for national defense at three levels of need which will
be explained in detail later.11 There was, and still is, no legislative
basis for the CRAF; its success depends upon the cooperation of the
airline industry.12 To foster that spirit of voluntary participation, as
well as to familiarize civil carriers with the handling of military
passengers and cargo, MAC awards yearly contracts to CRAF partici
pants for the provision of international air services. For Fiscal Year
(FY) 89, $310 million worth of airlift will be provided for MAC by
commercial carriers,13 The CRAF as of August 1989 is depicted in
Table 1. (It is worth noting that the exact size and composition of
the CRAF fluctuates from month to month as carriers add and drop
aircraft due to maintenance, sales, or equipment acquisitions.) By
far the largest and most important portion of the CRAF is the LongRange International Segment, consisting of 400 aircraft. This is the
element that supports MAC strategic operations, and necessitates the
use of aircraft capable of extended overwater operations with a
productive payload.
Participation in the CRAF involves a commitment on the part of
the carriers to respond to varying emergency situations incremen
tally, based on three levels of urgency. Stage I may be employed by
the Commander-In-Chief of MAC (CINCMAC) to maintain cargo and
passenger backlogs at MAC air bases within acceptable limits.
Carriers have 24 hours to make an aircraft available for missions.
- Stage II includes those airplanes in Stage I, and is for expanded airlift,
approved for use by the Secretary of Defense in providing capability
for a contingency not warranting a declaration of national emer-
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TABLE 1
CIVIL RESERVE AIR FLEET (CRAF)

Aircraft Allocated A$ of August 1989
Domestic Segment (39)
B727
DC-9
L-188
L-100

8
3
11
17

Alaskan Segment (7)
L-100
L-188
DC-6

3

2
2

Short-Range International Segment (30)
B-737
B-727
B-757

4
21

5

Long-Range International Segment (400)
DC-8/B-707
B-747
DC-10
L-1011
B-767/A310

Passenger (271)
20
109
57
38
47

+
+
+
-1+

Cargo (129)
51
52
26
0
0

71
161
83
38
47

(Source: MAC HQ Form 312, Monthly Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF)
Capability Summary, 1 August 89
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TABLE 2
CARRIERS PARTICIPATING IN THE CIVIL RESERVE AIR FLEET
As of August 1989
Domestic Segment
Evergreen International
Southern Air Transoport
TPI International
Zantop
Alaskan Segment
Markair
Northern Air Cargo
Reeve
Short-Range International Segment
Aloha
Eastern
Transocean
Joint Venture 1: Key/American Trans Air
Long-Range International Segment
American
Continental
Delta
Hawaiian
Northwest*
Joint Venture 1:
Flying Tiger*
Tower
UPS*
United
Joint Venture 3:
Northwest*
Federal Express
Joint Venture 5:
Pan American
American
Connie Kalitta*

Pan American
Southern Air Transport*
TWA
United*
Joint Venture 2:
World
Rosenbalm*
American
Evergreen*
Emery*
Joint Venture 4:
Pan American
Evergreen*
Tower
Joint Venture 6:
Pan American*
American Trans Air
Connie Kalitta*

Joint Venture 7:
Rosenbalm*
CF Air Freight*
•Airlines providing cargo aircraft
(Source: MAC HQ Form 312, Monthly Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) Capability
Summary, 1 August 89

gency. As in Stage I, carriers have 24 hours to make an aircraft avail
able. Stage III may be implemented by the Secretary of Defense,
only after a national emergency is declared by the President or
Congress. Carriers have 48 hours to respond to his call, which
results in the commitment of all long-range cargo aircraft Even
though Stage III utilizes all CRAF line-haul resources, it is still not
sufficient to meet wartime air cargo requirements, a shortcoming
that will be discussed in more detail later.14 Carriers participating in
the CRAF as of August 1989 are shown in Table 2.
Presently, the U.S. wartime airlift requirement for military cargo
is 66 million ton miles (MTM)/day, a figure that takes account of our
sealift capability and - the prepositioning of equipment at various
overseas locations. MAC organic aircraft (C-141/C-5) will provide
32.7 MTM/day capability, while the KC-10 (an aerial tanker/transport
based on the commercial DC-10) will generate an additional 4.5
MTM/day of military airlift15 A Stage III CRAF activation would result
in approximately 16 MTM/day capability, based on the CRAF compo
sition in August 1989.16 Thus, out of the 66 million ton miles/day
that must be moved in wartime, the U.S. can, at best, hope to
support only 53 million ton miles/day in the foreseeable future,
leaving a 13 million ton miles/day shortfall.
The shortage of required airlift was discussed earlier. Of critical
importance is the fact that this shortfall is exacerbated by a CRAF
now subject to the vagaries of the free market Deregulation of the
airline industry led to a dramatic increase in air carrier competition.
Coincidentally, costs (particularly for fuel) were rising while the
nation's economy faltered and fewer people travelled by air. The
airlines moved to adopt hub-and-spoke systems serviced by smaller
aircraft; carriers like Pan Am, United, and American abandoned all
cargo service and sold off their freighter aircraft; new carriers
entered the industry, squeezing profits still further and, in some
cases, failing quickly. Complicating the situation for our interna
tional airlines was the fact that, while we had deregulated our
commercial air industry, the rest of the world had not. Thus, U.S.
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airlines faced the added burden of having to compete with overseas
carriers owned or largely controlled by their respective governments,
and, in many cases, operated for reasons other than profit. The
result was a decade of upheaval in the air carrier industry that
directly impacted the Long-Range International segment of the CRAF
as well. The smaller airplanes being adopted by the carriers were
not suitable for long-haul overwater transportation, and, in fact,
were replacing older aircraft that could fulfill that mission. Braniff
International went bankrupt in 1981; Flying Tigers came perilously
close to following suit in 1986; and Pan American, after losing $72.7
million in 1988 (its 11 th moneylosing year out of the past 1 7),17 is
now actively seeking some sort of merger partner.18
The 1980's saw other developments of importance to the CRAF.
In 1983 the Air Force implemented the CRAF Enhancement Program
whereby convertibility features could be retrofitted (at government
expense) to existing passenger airplanes that would allow them to
transport military cargo in time of war. Of the 19 B747s committed
to the program, 15 have been modified as of late 1988.19 Another
DOD effort to address the declining number of long-range airliners in
the CRAF took the form of a joint venture (JV) Program initiated by
MAC in 1986. The intent of the program was to bolster the CRAF by
bringing in operators and/or carriers previously excluded from par
ticipating. Should the need arise, aircraft and crews from the joint
venture firms would be pooled and utilized as though they were
being supplied by a single entity.20 This enabled MAC to utilize the
significant cargo fleets of companies such as UPS and Emery, some
thing it had not been able to do before. Finally, growing concern
about the increasing age of the airliner fleet led foreign and domestic
carriers to embark on an unprecedented aircraft buying spree.
Boeing received orders for 636 aircraft valued at $30.1 billion in
1988,21 while McDonnell-Douglas logged $15.6 billion infirm
backlogs for the year.22 Of importance to this discussion is the fact
that included in those figures were firm orders for 1 72 B747-40023
and 103 MD-11 wide-body transports.24
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However, whether or not the CRAF will benefit by these devel
opments is uncertain. While the CRAF Enhancement Program
resulted in the addition of valuable wartime cargo-carrying capabil
ity, Pan Am was the only carrier willing to participate. Thus, there is
no ongoing stream of existing aircraft being modified; in fact, the
B747 lost over Scotland in December of 1988 was a CRAF enhanced
plane. The airline was contemplating putting twelve more aircraft
through the program, but the revenue capacity eliminated as a result
of the accident may necessitate postponement of that decision.25
Another area of concern centers around the wartime management
of the CRAF and its various component parts. A full-scale activation
would involve coordinating the efforts of 29 airlines and eight joint
ventures. Of the seven long-range international segment joint
ventures shown earlier in Table 2, three are made up of three
carriers each, while two more are comprised of four and five carriers
respectively. Notification procedures alone would to be daunting;
while the task of providing ongoing leadership in a contingency
environment would appear to be virtually impossible. Finally, the
growth in wide-body aircraft orders is a mixed blessing. For the first
time in over a decade, U.S. airlines are committing to wide-body
long range jets in appreciable numbers. American Airlines, for
instance, recently ordered eight MD-11s and optioned 42 more,26
while Delta ordered nine and optioned 31,27 But these are all
passenger versions that will provide no cargo carrying capability even
if they do eventually find their way into the CRAF. Furthermore, tax
law changes have combined with airline consolidations and mercu
rial market conditions to force a shift in transport aircraft purchasing
and ownership patterns. Carriers are finding short-term leases (i.e. 5
years) an increasingly attractive alternative to ownership.28 In fact,
30% of the U.S. commercial fleet is now leased, and that figure
could increase to 60-70% in the next decade.29 This gives the
airlines tremendous flexibility to change aircraft types in response to
competition and market opportunities, and eliminates the large
capital costs associated with purchasing their own aircraft. However,
one of the largest leasing companies in the world is CPA Group Ltd,
which is an Irish firm.30 This raises the specter of a further decline in
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the CRAF, since foreign-owned aircraft are excluded from participat
ing. In addition, the flexibility inherent in the leasing option will
work against the fleet stability so essential to the CRAF. Programs like
CRAF Enhancement are predicated upon maintaining the modified
aircraft in the U.S. fleet for considerably longer than five years.
The preceding discussion has served to illustrate a crucial fact:
the needs of the airlines no longer parallel those of national defense.
This is not, necessarily bad. However, there is no mechanism in
place to insure the maintenance of that industry/government linkage
forged during, and after, World War II. Indeed, we can't even
“draft” the carriers as we did then because their
smaller aircraft makes that proposition of limited
that missing link that is the crux of the problem.
lation Act of 1978 makes essentially no mention

emphasis on
value. Thus, it is
The Airline Deregu
of national defense,

retaining the position underlying previous aviation legislation that a
sound commercial air transport system would insure an adequate
reserve of airlift capability in the event of war. Thus, it would be
inaccurate to say that deregulation, in and of itself, placed the CRAF
in jeopardy. Rather, the move away from economic regulation
graphically illustrated that airline interests and defense transport
interests may not, for whatever reason, coincide. The implication is,
then, that in the absence of some mechanism to insure defense
transport needs are met, managerial responses to future environ
mental developments (advanced aircraft technology, noise and
pollution concerns, further market changes) could prove just as
detrimental to wartime airlift capability as deregulation has today.
Unfortunately, policy makers have not handled this divergence
very well. The perception is that the best way for the government to
foster support for the CRAF is within the confines of the free market,
as opposed to some sorts of more direct action that will delineated
later. Thus, after ten years of trying to negotiate the CRAF Enhance
ment Program, the end result was the large-scale participation of
only one carrier. Similarly, the almost inescapable conclusion is that
the Joint Venture program would, if implemented, prove to be an
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administrative and logistical nightmare. Finally, after almost four
decades, airline participation in the CRAF is still voluntary. In sum,
MAC and the DOD seem content to react to environmental changes
after they occur, rather than pushing for a more proactive approach
that does not rely solely on the vagaries of the free market

PERIPHERAL ISSUES
It is important to realize that the use of civil air transport re
sources for military purposes is, at best, a compromise. The C141
and the C5 were specifically designed to carry cargo and are charac
terized by a high wing design; that is, the fuselage is suspended from
the wing. This places the cargo compartment close to the ground,
and provides the drive on/drive off capability so essential to the mass
movement of wheeled equipment. The civilian air cargo industry on
the other hand uses aircraft that are derivatives of passenger planes.
The B747, the DC10, the B707 and the DC8 were not designed for
freight transportation. They have a low wing design which places
the fuselage above the wing, effectively eliminating any possibility for
drive on/drive off vehicle handling. In addition, the two systems
each utilize cargo pallets that are fundamentally different in design.
Those used by the military measure 88 inches by 108 inches, while
civilian pallets are either 88 or 96 inches by 125 inches.
Shipping military cargo aboard civil airliners presents some
unique problems, even in peacetime. Military aircraft and materials
handling equipment (MHE) are designed to handle DOD pallets
widthwise (i.e. the long edge is perpendicular to the aircraft's line of
flight). Narrow body airliners, as well as the DC10, are loaded from
the side, which means the pallets must first be placed into the CRAF
airplane, then manually spun 90 degrees before they are pushed
down the fuselage. On those B747s designed for loading through
the nose, the pallets must enter the aircraft lengthwise (i.e. the long
edge parallel to the line of flight). Hence, they all must be turned 90
degrees before they are put onto the loader. When this is done,
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military loading vehicles can carry only four pallets versus the five for
which they are designed. It is worth noting here that, while military
pallets can be transported on civilian airplanes, commercial pallets
and containers are virtually unusable on military aircraft. The rail
and locking systems aboard civilian aircraft can be adjusted to
accommodate both types of pallets, while military planes can only
accept Air Force pallets. Unfortunately, when airliners are used to
transport military cargo, suboptimal aircraft utilization can result
from the smaller size and reduced load bearing strength of DOD
pallets relative to airline pallets
Another problem is that extremely large pieces of cargo,
particularly rolling stock, are very difficult to handle via civilian
aircraft. When utilizing sideloading planes, they payload has to be
small enough and/or maneuverable enough to make the 90 degree
turn from the loader into the fuselage. In addition, the narrow cabin
of the DC8 or the B707 effectively limits the size and shape of the
shipment, as does the nose opening in the wide body. Finally, the
lack of a drive-in/drive-off capability proves to be a very limiting
factor, especially in the context of a wartime scenario. Of equal
concern is that military and civil loaders are basically restricted to
servicing their respective aircraft. That is, Air Force loading vehicles
were designed to handle aircraft having a cargo floor essentially at
truckbed height above the ground. While this equipment can also
service narrow-body airliners, it, cannot interface directly with widebody Freighters. An elevator of commercial design must be utilized
as a bridge between the aircraft and the loader; the plane simply
cannot be worked without it. Similarly, civilian loading equipment is
intended for use on aircraft having a cargo compartment that is ten
to fifteen feet above the ground. The cab is generally designed to fit
under the fuselage, something the low-slung military transport
aircraft does not allow.
The inescapable conclusion is that military and civilian cargo
handling systems are fundamentally incompatible. The two function
together in peacetime because there is sufficient time to overcome
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the constraints delineated earlier. But in a contingency situation
those limitations could prove crippling. Essentially, military pallets
and materials handling resources will be tasked to fulfill all wartime
requirements because of the incompatibilities previously mentioned.
Limitations on the type and size of cargo that can be moved aboard
civilian aircraft would necessitate a horrendous scheduling effort
intended to insure that aircraft and cargo are matched correctly.
The commercial elevator required for wide-body loading/unloading
is an obvious weakness since those aircraft cannot be serviced
without it Although MAC has prepositioned 116 of these elevators
throughout the airlift system,31 there is no guarantee that commercial
cargo missions will be, or can be, limited to those fields having an
elevator on station. Finally, the lack of a drive-on/drive-off capability
severely limits the effectiveness of civil airliners in a contingency
situation.

RECOMMENDATIONS
It is absolutely imperative that the nation's air transport re
sources become more responsive to the needs of national defense.
One long range solution to the airlift problem would be for both
MAC and the airlines to fly the same type of airplanes in the future.
This could lower the per plane cost to each group, and would
provide for a common cargo handling system while insuring a steady
growth in usable CRAF capability. Of course, the introduction of the
new C-17 widebody military transport (like the C-141 and C-5, also
a high-wing design) in the mid 1990s will go a long way towards
eliminating the airlift shortfall discussed earlier. But it will do
nothing to address the deteriorating condition of the CRAF. Similarly,
MAC has been working for years to put together a NATO "CRAF"
comprised of suitable aircraft from nations belonging to that alliance,
with little success. In truth, such a show of unity from countries of
widely, disparate cultures and ideologies seems doubtful. Another,
more immediate, alternative may be to capitalize on the renewed
interest being shown by US airlines in wide-body planes, and CRAF

,
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enhance all long range passenger aircraft before they come off the
assembly line. This would keep modification costs down, and would
provide a flow of contingency capability into the civil fleet Admit
tedly, the carriers might have some reservations about the effect of
the increased weight on aircraft's productive range, but the impact
of this could perhaps be minimized through some sort of abbrevi
ated enhancement package that would limit the wartime cargo
payload slightly in exchange for reduced structural strengthening.
From the standpoint of military airlift alone, the first solution
delineated above is the preferred one since it dramatically increases
not only capacity, but much needed drive-on/drive-off capability.
Unfortunately, the cost of this option is tremendous, and it does little
to address the ongoing health of the CRAF. Rather, the third alterna
tive seems the smarter choice. By enhancing new civil aircraft,
increased contingency airlift can be obtained at a reasonable perplane cost. While these airplanes could not provide drive-on/driveoff flexibility of their military counterparts, perhaps bulky vehicles
and other large cargo could be earmarked for MAC. Alternatively,
funds could be spent to develop loading equipment that would
allow roll-on/roll-off loading and unloading of civil aircraft At any
rate, a continuous CRAF enhancement program sensitive to the
revenue needs of the carriers, seems to offer the most promise for
sustained CRAF growth.

CONCLUSIONS
Prior to 1978, the moods of the DOD tended to coincide nicely
with those of the airlines. The latter wanted bigger, faster, longerrange aircraft, which was exactly what the former desired. The
airlines could afford to buy those aircraft and were, by and large,
perfectly willing to commit them to the CRAF. But while their
collective enthusiasm for the CRAF remains just as strong today, the
realities of the free market have made them less able to participate.
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MAC approached one large US carrier several years ago, requesting
that several new B747s be CRAF enhanced while still on the assem
bly line. The airline declined, citing range/payload penalties result
ing from the weight of the modifications that would have rendered
them less competitive over their long-haul routes. To put it bluntly,
we simply do not have the means to rapidly transport the men and
equipment needed to support DOD contingency plans. This, in turn,
places the entire logistics effort at risk, a situation with grave implica
tions for the nation's defense posture. Recall that the purpose of
logistics is to create and sustain military forces to support national
policy and objectives. Unless the relationship between the industrial
providers and government users of air transportation is redefined to
reflect the changing needs of both, America's strategic airlift capabil
ity will become a casualty of deregulation. The loss of such an
important national resource must not be allowed to happen.
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